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NOTES
OIL AND GAS-OVERCONVEYANCES-ARKANSAS ADOPTS A
MODIFIED VERSION OF THE DUHIG RULE. Peterson v. Simpson, 286
Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985).
Bullock conveyed land to Baird, reserving 50% of the minerals,
which he continued to own throughout various subsequent conveyances.
Baird later conveyed the land and the other 50% of the minerals to
Payne. Payne then conveyed the land and the 50% of the minerals to
Pope. Pope subsequently conveyed to Andrews by warranty deed with
the following reservation: "Reserving however, from this conveyance,
for the grantors herein, their heirs and assigns forever, ONE-HALF
( ) of all oil, gas, coal and other minerals, in and to and that might be
produced from the said real estate."' After a series of intermediate
conveyances, Andrews' interest was finally conveyed to Simpson and
his wife. The deed to the Simpsons contained the following language:
"This deed is made subject to reservations of one half ( ) of all miner-
als heretofore reserved. It is meant by this deed to convey the surface
and one half of all minerals."" Pope's heirs brought an action against
the Simpsons to quiet title in the one-half mineral interests in the land
that Pope purported to reserve in his warranty deed to Andrews.
The plaintiffs argued that in construing the warranty deed, the
court should determine Pope's subjective intent at the time he conveyed
the land to Andrews. The defendants, on the other hand, urged the
court to adopt the rule established in the Texas case of Duhig v. Peavy-
Moore Lumber Co.,' which is an objective rule of construction. Appli-
cation of this rule would result in ignoring Pope's intent at the time he
conveyed to Andrews, and in construing the warranty deeds as convey-
ing all of Pope's interest with no reservation.
The trial court ruled that the warranty deed failed to reserve an
undivided 50% interest in the oil, gas and other minerals. The Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it would apply the Duhig rule
1. 286 Ark. 177, 180, 690 S.W.2d 720, 723 (1985).
2. Id. at 180-81, 690 S.W.2d at 723.
3. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
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because the original parties were not involved. However, the court
stated that in cases in which the original parties are involved, the reser-
vation in the deed must be given effect, according to the intention of
the parties. Peterson v. Simpson, 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720
(1985).
The Arkansas Supreme Court traditionally has followed the com-
mon law approach of construing mineral deeds according to the inten-
tion of the parties.4 Specifically, it has followed this approach in deter-
mining the rights and liabilities of the parties under a grant or
reservation of mineral interests,' and in determining whether the in-
strument conveyed, reserved, or excepted the mineral interest.6 In con-
struing a grant or a reservation of mineral interests, the court has ana-
lyzed the instrument of conveyance as a whole to determine the
intention of the parties.' If the instrument is ambiguous, the court has
considered the particular circumstances and understanding of the par-
ties at the time of the execution of the instrument. If ambiguities can-
not be resolved by any other rule of construction, the court has applied
the general rule of construing the instrument against the grantor, or
the party who prepared the instrument.8
Construing the document in accordance with the intention of the
parties sometimes conflicts with the "repugnancy rule," which states
that a reservation or exception not contained in the granting clause of a
deed is void as repugnant to the grant.9 In the past, any attempt to
reserve or except a fraction in the habendum clause was ineffective be-
cause the reservation or exception derogated the estate conveyed in the
granting clause. 10 The modern tendency, however, is to sustain the res-
ervation or exception if the intention of the parties is apparent from an
examination of the instrument. This is so even though the result may
4. See Barret v. Kuhr., 264 Ark. 347, 572 S.W.2d 135 (1978) (royalty deed interpreted so as
to make all parts of instrument harmonize and give effect to intention of parties to oil and gas
lease); Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 427 S.W.2d 202 (1968) (deed examined to determine
intention of parties).
5. See Gearhart v. McAlester Fuel Co., 199 Ark. 981, 136 S.W.2d 679 (1940).
6. Keith v. Keith, 183 Ark. 1017, 39 S.W.2d 706 (1931).
7. See Gibson v. Pickett, 256 Ark. 1035, 512 S.W.2d 532 (1974) (basic rule in construction
of deeds is to ascertain and give effect to the real intention of the parties, particularly the grantor,
as expressed by language used, when not contrary to settled principles of law); Wynn v. Sklar &
Phillips Oil Co., 254 Ark. 332, 493 S.W.2d 439 (1973) (intention of parties must be ascertained
from the four corners of the document); Waters v. Edwards, 196 Ark. 1088, 121 S.W.2d 79
(1938) (document of conveyance was unambiguous and clearly reflected intention of parties).
8. Gibson, 256 Ark. at 1041, 512 S.W.2d at 536.
9. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, and D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.2, at
718-19 (1984).
10. See Cole v. Collie, 131 Ark. 103, 198 S.W. 710 (1917).
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be contrary to the legal effect of the granting clause considered alone.1"
In a number of cases, courts have abandoned the repugnancy rule and
have given effect to a reservation or exception of mineral interests, irre-
spective of the location of the clause. These courts have looked to
whether the language of the deed reflects the grantor's intent to with-
hold the minerals from the conveyance. 2
Construing an instrument of conveyance in accordance with the
intention of the parties presents an additional problem. In excluding a
certain fraction from their conveyance, grantors often use the term res-
ervation when it actually is an exception, and vice-versa. Technically, a
clear distinction exists between a "reservation" and an "exception" in a
deed. The term "exception" means that the grantor is excluding from
the conveyance a previously outstanding interest in a third party. The
term "reservation," on the other hand, is generally interpreted as re-
flecting the grantor's intention to keep a fractional interest for him-
self.13 The terms are so often used interchangeably, however, that the
technical distinction frequently has been disregarded when the parties'
intent can be otherwise determined.1 4 Some courts, for example, have
construed a reservation as an exception when necessary to carry out the
intention of the parties.
1 5
However, the distinction between a reservation in the grantor and
an exception of a third party's interest is particularly important in con-
veyances of fractional mineral interests if the total of the fractions re-
served and conveyed is greater than 100%. This type of "overcon-
veyance" often results in confusion and litigation. Typically, the
11. See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R. 2d 1374, 1407 (1958).
12. See generally Carter Oil Co. v. Weil, 209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W.2d 215 (1946) (express
reservation of oil and mineral rights in separate paragraph foillowing habendum clause not void as
repugnant to granting clause). In Beasley v. Shinn, 201 Ark. 31, 144 S.W.2d 710 (1940), the
court held that since reservations of mineral rights often appear in the habendum, it is not just to
apply the technical rule of limitation. Instead, consideration is to be given to the intention of the
parties as gathered from the entire document. See also Stewart v. Warren, 202 Ark. 873, 153
S.W.2d 545 (1941) (mineral interest purportedly conveyed in fee by granting clause to be limited
to a ten-year period by habendum clause).
13. See Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979); Piper v. Mowris, 466 Pa. 89, 351
A.2d 635 (1976). See also Annot., 146 A.L.R. 880, at 894-95 ((1943).
14. Meyers and Williams, Oil and Gas Conveyancing: Grants and Reservations by Owners of
Mineral Interests, 43 VA. L. REV. 639 at 644-45 (1957).
15. See Adkins v. Arsht, 50 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. I11. 1943) (conveyance of land "excepting"
all minerals was sufficient to constitute a "reservation" in grantor); Hurd v. Byrnes, 264 Or. 591,
506 P.2d 686 (1973) (no significance attached to terms "exception" or "reservation" since the
terms could be used interchangeably); Brown v. Kirk, 127 Col. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953) (inten-
tion of parties controls irrespective of the terms used); Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark.




situation arises when the grantor owns the surface and an undivided
interest in the minerals in the land. The other 50% fractional mineral
interest is outstanding in a third party. Despite owning only 50% of the
minerals, the grantor executes a warranty deed conveying the property
but, at the same time, reserves 50% of the minerals. The problem
presented by this scenario is in determining what exactly the grantor
conveyed and what he reserved.
If the conveyance is by means of a warranty deed, some courts
have dealt with the problem by applying the rule of Duhig v. Peavy-
Moore Lumber Co.16 In that case, with the facts described above, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the grantor had conveyed his 50% of
the minerals to the grantee, and thus retained no interest in them. Ap-
plication of the Duhig rule results in the grantor owning nothing. The
grantee owns the surface and 50% of the minerals, and the other 50%
remains outstanding in a third party. The rule requires that if a previ-
ous outstanding interest in a third party precludes the court from giv-
ing full effect to both the granted and the reserved mineral interests,
the granted mineral interest will take priority over the reserved inter-
est.1 7 In effect, the Duhig rule deducts the overconveyed fractional in-
terest from the grantor's interest.
Two rationales were given in the Duhig case in support of the rule.
Writing for himself,18 Commissioner Smedley identified the problem as
one purely of construction. He believed that established rules of con-
struction mandated the result. Applying these rules, Commissioner
Smedley found that by using a warranty deed, the grantor showed an
intention to convey and warrant title to the grantee of all the surface
and 50% of the mineral interest in the land. Since the grantor owned
sufficient interest to satisfy the purported conveyance, no breach of
warranty occurred. He interpreted the reservation clause as withdraw-
ing or excepting from the conveyance the third party's outstanding 50%
interest.19 Several jurisdictions have adopted this one-step reasoning."
The majority of the court in Duhig adopted a different approach,
based on a two-step reasoning process. This reasoning required that
16. 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
17. J.S. LowE, OIL AND GAS LAW 128 (1983).
18. Commissioner Smedley wrote the court's opinion, and agreed with the outcome, even
though he did not agree with the analysis of the majority of the court.
19. Meyers and Williams, Oil and Gas Conveyancing: Grants and Reservations by Owners of
Mineral Interests, 43 VA. L. REv. 639 at 644-45 (1957).
20. See Lucas v. Thompson, 240 Miss. 767, 128 So. 2d 874 (1961); Garraway v. Bryant, 224
Miss. 459, 80 So. 2d 59 (1955); Murphy v. Athans, 265 P.2d 461 (Okla. 1953); Montgomery v.
Ebony Hills Improvement Co., 229 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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both the granting and reservation clauses be given effect; this resulted
in a breach of warranty. First, the granting clause of the deed was
given effect, transferring all of the surface and 50% of the minerals to
the grantee; the grantor owned nothing. Next, the reservation was also
given effect, and the 50% interest in the minerals returned to the gran-
tor. At this point, the grantor was in breach of his warranty since he
could not honor the 50% mineral interest he purported to guarantee in
the warranty deed. In order to rectify the breach of warranty, the court
made an analogy to the doctrine of estoppel by deed against the asser-
tion of an after-acquired title. 1 Since giving effect to the grantor's res-
ervation resulted in a breach of warranty, the court held that the gran-
tor was estopped from asserting a reservation to the extent that the
reservation would result in an overconveyance. Thus, for the second
time, the court transferred the 50% mineral interest to the grantee.
Several jurisdictions have adopted this two-step analysis.22 Some cases
following this analysis focus on the reliance of the innocent grantee on
the representations made by the grantor, 23 and others on the warranty
given by the grantor.
In applying the Duhig rule, courts have been inconsistent as to the
rationale underlying the rule. Some courts follow the Commissioner's
one-step analysis. Others follow the two-step analysis of the majority of
the court. Under either rationale, however, the Duhig rule deducts a
sufficient portion from the grantor's reservation to give effect to the
21. The common law doctrine of after-acquired title, also known as the doctrine of estoppel
by deed, applies when a grantor conveys property by warranty deed at a time when he does not
own the property. If he later acquires the property, title immediately passes to the grantee. The
doctrine of after-acquired title gives a grantee additional protection resulting from his warranty
deed. The term "estoppel by deed" arises from the fact that the grantor is "estopped" from deny-
ing the validity of the deed he delivered. R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2, at 117
(1983). In Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), a case presenting facts very
similar to those of Duhig, the court applied the Duhig rule, and stated:
Estoppel by warranty is a species of estoppel by deed. It is an estoppel based on the
principle of giving effect to the manifest intention of the grantor appearing on the deed,
as to the lands or estate to be conveyed, and of preventing the grantor from derogating
from or destroying his own grant by any subsequent act.
Id. at 756 (quoting 31 C.JS. Estoppel § 10, at 297 (1964)).
22. See Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971); Bryan v. Everett, 365 P.2d
146 (Okla. 1961); Body v. McDonald, 79 Wyo. 371, 334 P.2d 513 (1959); Brannon v. Varnado,
234 Miss. 466, 106 So. 2d 386 (1958); McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341,
304 S.W.2d 267 (Garwood, J., dissenting) (1957); Merchants and Manufacturers Bank v. Dennis,
229 Miss. 447, 91 So. 2d 254 (1956); Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953);
Howell v. Liles, 246 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Salmen Brick and Lumber Co. v. Wil-
liams, 210 Miss. 560, 50 So. 2d 130 (1951); Klein v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 126 Tex. 450,
86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935).
23. R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2, at 120 (1983).
1985-861
UALR LAW JOURNAL
fractional interest conveyed to the grantee.2 4 If the grantor's reserved
interest is not enough to make the grantee whole, in addition, the
grantee can recover damages for the remaining unsatisfied fractional
interest.2 5
Ten states have adopted the Duhig rule as announced by the
Texas Supreme Court or in some modified version.26 Courts adopting
the Duhig rule have reasoned that if the grantor has warranted title,
then he should bear the risk of losing title in case of an overconveyance.
These courts think it is particularly appropriate to adopt this reasoning
when the breach of warranty can be remedied by transferring the land
from the grantor to the grantee. The determining question for courts
adopting the Duhig rule has not been what the grantor intended to
reserve for himself, but rather what he purported to give to the grantee
when he executed the warranty deed.17 Others, however, have criticized
the rule's harsh result to the grantor, who intended to reserve an inter-
est but, merely because of poor draftsmanship in the warranty deed, is
left without any property. 8
24. The Duhig rule does not affect a grantor who owns a sufficient amount of minerals to
satisfy both his conveyance to the grantee and the reservation to himself. See Brown v. Kirk, 127
Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953), in which the grantor owned three-fourths of the minerals and
conveyed the land by warranty deed, reserving and excepting one-half of the minerals. The court
held that the deed conveyed one-half of the minerals to the grantee, that the grantor retained a
one-fourth mineral interest, and that the other one-fourth was outstanding in a third party.
25. R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2, at 118 (1983).
26. Alabama, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming. J.S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW 128 (1983). For a listing of cases
applying the Duhig rule, see I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 311 (1981).
27. Meyers and Williams, Oil and Gas Conveyancing: Grants and Reservations by Owners of
Mineral Interests, 43 VA. L. REv. 639, 655 (1957) (citing American Republics Corp. v. Houston
Oil Co., 173 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949)).
28. See Meyers and Williams, Oil and Gas Conveyancing: Grants and Reservations by Own-
ers of Mineral Interests, 43 VA. L. REv. 639, 654 (1957), discussing the arguments given by a
dissenting justice in Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 210 Miss. 560, 50 So. 2d 130
(1951). Justice Alexander argued that a reservation of minerals to the grantor should be given
effect. He did not think it was necessary for the court to save the grantor anticipatorily from a suit
for breach of warranty. See also Ellis, Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 947 (1982). Professor Ellis criticizes the logic of the reasoning behind the Duhig rule. He
suggests that a proper analysis of the rule, in light of its purpose and function, can only be made
after its estoppel trappings have been set aside. He submits that the rule is not intended to un-
cover the "real" intention of the parties but rather to protect bona fide purchasers. Professor Ellis
reinterprets the rule as consisting of two sub-rules, which he says are the "established rules of
construction" upon which Commissioner Smedley based his opinion in Duhig:.
(I) A warranty deed that does not specify the quantum of interest in the minerals
being granted purports to grant 100%, or the totality, of the interest in the
minerals.
(2) If the grantor of a warranty deed does not own enough interest to fill both the
grant and the reservation, the grant must be filled first.
[Vol. 8:267
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Courts have held the Duhig rule inapplicable in various situations.
For instance, it has been held inapplicable to oil and gas leases, in part
because of their special nature,2 9 and because the rule would divest the
lessor of his royalties.30
Some courts have also held the Duhig rule inapplicable to cases in
which the grantee has actual or constructive notice of the prior out-
standing interest held by a third party. Under the Duhig rule, however,
the grantee's knowledge of the outstanding interest in a third party is
immaterial.31 The basic question under the Duhig rule is determining
what exactly the deed purported to convey, irrespective of the grantee's
knowledge.
3 2
However, courts that view estoppel by deed as the underlying the-
ory of the Duhig rule consider the grantee's knowledge to be signifi-
cant. These courts, therefore, have found the Duhig rule inapplicable
when the grantee had actual or constructive notice of the outstanding
interest in a third party.83 In these cases, the reservation is given its
intended effect, since the grantee cannot argue that the function of the
reservation clause was to inform him of the outstanding fractional in-
terest. Since the grantee had knowledge of the outstanding interest, the
grantor cannot be said to have warranted title to an innocent grantee.
Under the reasoning of these courts, therefore, the grantee's knowledge
will preclude application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed. 4
Id. at 954. Professor Ellis refers to these rules as the "100% rule" and the "allocation of shortage
rule," respectively. Id.
29. McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957) (Duhig rule not applied
because mineral lease is normally prepared by lessee and thus there is no reason to interpret
ambiguities against the lesssor). See also J.S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW 131 (1983).
30. See McLain v. First Nat'l Bank, 263 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), in which the
court adopted the Duhig rule with regard to an overconveyance of a mineral interest, but not with
regard to the payment of benefits. The court held that parties may contract to divide the economic
benefits in proportions different from the proportions in which they own the title. See also Benge
v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953).
31. In Duhig, the grantee had actual notice of the outstanding interest in the third party, but
the court viewed this as irrelevant to the application of the breach of warranty theory. In the
court's view, the grantee's actual notice was of no importance, since the grantor's liability arose at
the moment he delivered the deed with the intended reservation.
32. 69 OIL AND GAS REPORTER 530 (1981). See also Body v. McDonald, 79 Wyo. 371, 334
P.2d 513 (1959); Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953); and Scarmando v. Potter,
613 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), in which the Duhig rule was applied irrespective of the
grantee's knowledge of the prior interest.
33. In Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981), the court specifically rejected
Duhig and decided the case on ordinary equitable estoppel principles based on the actions and
statements of the parties, rather than on formal representations of the warranty deed. See also
Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), in which the court simply ignored Duhig.
34. See supra note 21.
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The Duhig rule has also been held inapplicable to conveyances
made by a quitclaim deed.35 The rationale of the Duhig rule is that
since the function of a warranty deed is to warrant title to the property
being conveyed, a grantor cannot covenant title and in the same docu-
ment reserve a fractional interest, if the total of the fractions conveyed
and reserved is greater than 100%. The function of a quitclaim deed,
by contrast, is to grant only whatever interest, if any, the grantor has in
a designated tract. 6 In Arkansas, a quitclaim deed is a substantive
mode of conveyance, and is as effective to carry all the right, title, in-
terest, claim and estate of the grantor as a deed with full covenants.
However, a quitclaim deed contains no warranty of title.
37
In view of the absence of warranty of title, the Supreme Courts of
Arkansas 38 and Mississippi3" have found the Duhig rationale inapplica-
ble to conveyances made by quitclaim deed. These courts viewed the
grantor as having no obligation to protect the grantee against any prior
interest in a third party. The courts construed the deed as transferring
only the interest the grantor owned at the time of the conveyance.
Therefore, since a quitclaim deed does not warrant that the grantor
will convey any particular interest, the grantor's mineral reservation is
not affected.."
In Hill v. Gilliam,"1 the Arkansas Supreme Court was faced with
an overconveyance by quitclaim deed. The plaintiffs argued that giving
effect to the grantor's reservation would result in an overconveyance,
since the total of the fractions conveyed and reserved was greater than
100%. They asserted that the Duhig rule was, therefore, applicable.
The plaintiffs further asserted that the court should construe the deed
as conveying all of the grantor's interest, with no reservation to himself.
The defendants, in turn, argued that although other jurisdictions had
applied the rule to warranty deeds, it should not apply to a quitclaim
deed.
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled for the defendants, holding
that the Duhig rule was inapplicable because the reservation appeared
35. Hill v. Gilliam, 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985); Rosenbaum v. McCaskey, 386
So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1980).
36. 2 OIL AND GAS REPORTER 1359, 1360 (1953).
37. Smith v. Olin Industries, 224 Ark. 606, 610, 275 S.W.2d 439, 441 (1955) (citing Bagley
v. Fletcher, 44 Ark. 153 (1884)).
38. Hill v. Gilliam, 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985).
39. Rosenbaum v. McCaskey, 386 So. 2d 387 (Miss. 1980).
40. Rosenbaum, 386 So. 2d at 389-90,followed in Hill, 284 Ark. at 386, 682 S.W.2d at 738.
41. 284 Ark. 383, 682 S.W.2d 737 (1985).
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in a quitclaim deed.42 The court reasoned that since a quitclaim deed
only conveys whatever interest the grantor may have, the grantor had
not warranted anything by conveying with a quitclaim deed.' 3 Addi-
tionally, the court found that in executing a quitclaim deed and reserv-
ing a 50% mineral interest in the property, the grantor had shown his
intention to keep his 50% interest. 4 The court interpreted the reserva-
tion contained in the grantor's quitclaim deed as serving one of two
possible functions. One function, the court said, could have been to no-
tify the grantee that a third party owned a 50% interest and that the
grantor owned only 50% of the property.'" The other function could
have been to inform the grantee of the grantor's intention to keep title
to the reserved fractional interest. 4" The court found that the reserva-
tion was not designed to serve the first function. The court reasoned
that, since the grantee had actual knowledge of the outstanding one-
half interest owned by the third party, the reservation could not have
been intended to notify the grantee of this fact.47 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the only function of the reservation clause was to notify the
grantee of the grantor's intention to keep title to his 50% interest.48 The
court also found it significant that the reservation appeared in the
granting clause, indicating that the grantor meant to reserve that inter-
est to himself.
49
In the principal case, Peterson v. Simpson,0 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court was faced with the question of whether to apply the
42. 284 Ark. at 387, 682 S.W.2d at 738.
43. Id. at 387, 682 S.W.2d at 739.





49. Id. Hill is an interesting case because its dictum concerning the grantee's actual notice of
the pre-existing interest in the third party indicates that, even in the case of a conveyance by
warranty deed, the court might not adopt the Duhig rule. The court in Duhig viewed the grantee's
actual (or constructive) notice as immaterial. It held that, irrespective of the grantee's knowledge,
the grantor was estopped from asserting title to the reservation because he had breached the
covenant of title he had purported to warrant by the warranty deed. Therefore, if the Arkansas
Supreme Court viewed actual notice on the part of the grantee in Hill as an important factor, it
seems to have followed the reasoning of Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981),
which rejected the Duhig rule. In that case, the North Dakota court gave effect to the grantor's
reservation contained in a warranty deed in view of the grantee's actual notice of the outstanding
fractional interest in a third party. The Hill case left unanswered the question of whether, in the
case of a warranty deed, the Arkansas Supreme Court would follow the reasoning of the Duhig
court and would view actual or constructive notice as irrelevant, or instead would follow
Gilbertson.
50. 286 Ark. 177, 690 S.W.2d 720 (1985).
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Duhig rule to an overconveyance by warranty deed. The court affirmed
the chancellor's ruling that the warranty deed failed to reserve an undi-
vided 50% interest in the minerals. The court held that, in cases not
involving the original grantor and his immediate grantee, the deed was
to be construed according to objective rules of construction, including
the Duhig rule. The court held that subjective interpretation was not
appropriate in such cases. Since the original parties were not involved,
the court reasoned that it would be improper to try to ascertain the
intentions of the original grantor. Accordingly, the court held that the
grantee was to receive the percentage of the land that the grantor pur-
ported to reserve. The grantor's reservation could not be given effect in
view of the outstanding interest in a third party. The court held that if
both the grant and the reservation could not be given effect, the reser-
vation must fail and the risk of title loss must fall on the grantor.
The court was greatly influenced in its decision by an article writ-
ten by Professor Willis H. Ellis of the University of New Mexico
School of Law.51 Professor Ellis views the preservation of the recording
system as the underlying reason for applying rules of construction such
as the Duhig rule.52 He states that:
Without such objective rules of construction, marketable title, and
thus a market in mineral rights, would not be possible. The initial
question faced by a court that is dealing with a Duhig problem is not
whether to follow Duhig or some other rule of construction. The first
question is whether to set aside all objective rules of construction and
engage in a substantive inquiry into the meaning of the deed or to find
the intent of the parties objectively according to accepted rules of
construction.
5 3
Professor Ellis further states that:
The goal of interpretation is finding, if possible, the actual intent of
the parties. Relevant facts, which are admitted by the parties or are
proper matters for judicial notice, can be taken into account if doing
so will not injure the rights of subsequent purchasers or undermine
reliance on the recording system. When, however, fairness to individ-
ual parties and preservation of a viable recording system are in con-
flict, preservation of the recording system, being more important,
must control. 54
51. Ellis, Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 947 (1982).





In adopting the foregoing reasoning, the court quoted at length from
Professor Ellis' article.55
Fairness was the basis for the court's adoption of the Duhig rule.
The court reasoned:
To decide the issue now on the basis of what Pope subjectively
thought, or intended, when he conveyed to Andrews in 1948, when
neither the grantees, nor the title examiners were privy to that
thought, would be greatly unfair. As Professor Ellis stated in conclud-
ing his article on Duhig. "The Duhig Rule is not intended to uncover
the 'real' intent of the parties. It is intended to protect BFP's.""
The court reasoned that rejection of the Duhig rule would not only be
unfair, but would also sacrifice the degree of certainty that the rule can
provide to the marketing of mineral rights and would result in an out-
break of lawsuits.5 7 In the court's view, "[subsequent purchasers, or
grantees, must be able to rely" on an objective interpretation of the
document of conveyance.58
The court further reasoned that there were "only two reasonable
ways to read a warranty deed which does not specify the quantum of
interest conveyed, either 'no interest' or 'all the interest there is.' "5
The court concluded that the deed conveyed all the interest, since inter-
preting the deed as conveying no interest would be contrary to the ex-
pectations of reasonable people.6 0 In view of the fact that the grantor
did not own enough interest to satisfy both the grant and his reserva-
tion, the court found that it was fair to allocate the loss to the grantor,
who could have prevented the misunderstanding in the first place. 61
The dissent argued that if the deed had simply stated that it re-
served or excepted 50% of the minerals, then the Duhig rule would be
useful.62 In that instance, the deed would be ambiguous and a rule of
objective construction would be of some help.63 However, the dissent
argued, since the deed in the Peterson case clearly stated that the res-
ervation was "for the grantors herein, their heirs and assigns forever,"64
it clearly stated the intention of the parties, and thus it was not neces-
55. 286 Ark. at 179-80, 690 S.W.2d at 722-23.
56. Id. at 181, 690 S.W.2d at 723.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 286 Ark. at 181-82, 690 S.W.2d at 724.
60. Id. at 182, 698 S.W.2d at 724.
61. Id.





sary to follow the Duhig rule. 5 The dissent further argued that by
adopting an objective rule of construction, the majority was anticipato-
rily relieving the grantee from having to pursue his remedy on the
warranty. 66
Peterson is interesting because, while reaching the Duhig result,
the Arkansas Supreme Court did not, in fact, adopt the reasoning of
the majority of the Duhig court. The court did not adopt the two-step
approach of giving effect to both the grant and the reservation, and
then rectifying the breach of warranty by applying the doctrine of es-
toppel by deed. Instead, the court adopted only the breach of warranty
theory and applied the "established rules of construction" discussed by
Commissioner Smedley in Duhig. In fact, Justice Dudley noted that it
was not necessary to accept the Texas majority's two-step estoppel the-
ory in order to accept the Duhig result.1
7
Another limitation in the court's adoption of the Duhig rule is that
it will only be applied "in cases which do not involve the original gran-
tor and his immediate grantee." '68 In cases involving the original par-
ties, the court will continue using a subjective approach in construing
the deed. The court may have preferred this approach because the orig-
inal parties to the deed presumably would be available to clarify ambi-
guities. Moreover, use of a subjective approach in such cases could not
prejudice a subsequent grantee who was not a party to the conveyance.
Peterson did not expressly address the question of the relevancy of
the grantee's knowledge of the outstanding interest. However, in view
of the subjective approach that will still be used in cases involving the
original parties, it should follow that the grantee's knowledge will in-
deed be relevant. The deed will be construed in accordance with the
intention of the parties if the original parties are available. Therefore,
the grantor will presumably be permitted to argue that since the
grantee knew or should have known of the outstanding interest, his in-
tention to reserve a fractional interest must be given effect, even if such
reservation appeared in a warranty deed. In such a case, the actual or
constructive knowledge of the grantee will therefore relieve the grantor
of the risk of title loss.
Another notable feature of the Peterson decision is that the court
engaged in a balancing test.69 On the one hand, the court viewed the
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 179, 690 S.W.2d at 722.




Duhig rule as preserving the recording system and protecting bona fide
purchasers. On the other hand, it reasoned that in cases involving the
original parties, fairness required giving effect to the intentions of the
grantor. Such balancing of interests is inconsistent with the objective
approach of Duhig. Had the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the
two-step analysis of the Duhig rule, as opposed to a selective adoption
of the Duhig result, the grantor, as a matter of law, would be responsi-
ble for the overconveyance.
All these limitations indicate that Arkansas has not adopted the
two-step analysis of the majority of the Duhig court; at most, it has
only adopted the Commissioner's analysis and the result of the Duhig
case. This selective adoption of the Duhig result will not bring the cer-
tainty to overconveyances of fractional interests that adoption of the
Duhig rule itself would have done. The Peterson decision means that
the Duhig rule will not be applied in all cases. In some cases resolution
of ambiguities created by overconveyaices of mineral interests must
still depend on subjective standards. In others, when the original parties
are not available, objective standards may be used. Decisions such as
Peterson70 may be equitable but they diminish the warranty deed's
function as a guarantee of title.7' The result will be that title searches
will become more expensive and time consuming, and less dependable.
Further, the practical effect of viewing the intention of the parties as
the determining factor will be to reduce the covenant of title contained
in a warranty deed to substantially meaningless language.7 2 Depending
upon the court's analysis of the intention of the parties, the grantee
may not necessarily be without remedy. However, the primary value of
the warranty of title in a warranty deed is undermined where the gran-
tor contends that, notwithstanding his warranty, he did not intend to
convey the disputed fractional interest.
The decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Peterson serves as
a warning to lawyers who draft documents conveying fractional min-
eral interests. Drafters of warranty deeds must exercise the utmost care
to avoid the Duhig result in subsequent litigation in which the original
parties are not involved. Adoption of the Duhig result would be very
favorable to those claiming under the grantee. On the other hand, if
the litigation does involve the original parties, since the court will look
70. Cases rejecting the Duhig rule in favor of a subjective determination of the intention of
the parties are Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981) and Hartman v. Potter, 596
P.2d 653 (Utah 1979).
71. J.S. LowE, OIL AND GAS LAW 129 (1983).
72. Id. at 130.
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to the intention of the parties, the grantee will not necessarily be pro-
tected by the grantor's warranty of title.
In order to avoid these overconveyances, three steps have been sug-
gested: (1) The reservation should specifically refer to all previously
reserved or conveyed interests; (2) the reservation should be accompa-
nied by a statement of intention that explains what the interests of the
parties will be; and (3) the reservation should be carefully worded to
avoid ambiguity. 3 Also, if the granting clause is worded properly, lan-
guage reserving an interest would presumably not be needed.
Ranko Shiraki Oliver
73. Id. at 132.
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